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probable	 cause	 and	 warrant	 requirements.	 Using	 a	 border	 search,	 the	




the	 technique	 and	 reaching	 conflicting	 decisions.	 Courts	 need	 to	 take	 an	
approach	that	will	protect	the	privacy	interests	of	individuals	while	allowing	
the	government	to	advance	its	interests	in	protecting	its	borders	and	fighting	
crime.	 Courts	 should	 adopt	 a	 border	 nexus	 standard:	 to	 be	 considered	 a	


































ditional	 use:	 a	 person	 crosses	 a	 national	 border	 from	 outside	 the	
United	States,	and	an	authorized	customs	agent	conducts	a	warrant-
less	 and	 suspicionless	 search	 of	 the	 person	 and	 their	 belongings.	
Courts	 justify	 this	 invasion	 of	 individual	 privacy	 with	 the	 govern-
ment’s	need	to	protect	its	borders	from	contraband.2	When	the	gov-









from	 the	 justifications	underlying”	 search	 incident	 to	arrest	 excep-
tion.5		
Border	 searches	 conducted	 as	 part	 of	 a	 criminal	 investigation	
similarly	threaten	to	fatally	“untether”	border	searches	“from	the	jus-




























ered	 constitutionally	 unreasonable	 under	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	
unless	the	official	has	(1)	probable	cause,	and	(2)	a	warrant	or	a	rec-















individual	 privacy	 from	government	 intrusion.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	


















from	 potential	 Fourth	 Amendment	 violations.13	 “Wherever	 a	 man	
may	be,	he	is	entitled	to	know	that	he	will	remain	free	from	unreason-
able	searches	and	seizures;”14	this	must	include	the	border.	
Currently,	 however,	 border	 searches—searches	 conducted	 by	
customs	agents	at	the	United	States	border	or	its	“functional	equiva-
lent”15—are	 generally	 found	 to	 be	 reasonable	 even	when	 not	 sup-
ported	by	a	warrant	and	probable	cause.16	Border	searches	are	part	
of	 a	 larger	 category	 of	 searches	 that	 are	 exempt	 from	 the	 Fourth	
Amendment	probable	cause	and	warrant	requirement	known	as	ad-
ministrative	searches.17	 In	addition	to	border	searches,	administra-















































that	 the	 government’s	interest	“is	 at	 its	zenith	at	 the	 interna-
tional	border.”28	The	government’s	interest	reaches	this	zenith	at	the	
border	because	government	agents	are	acting	to	protect	the	United	















Rights,	 including	 the	Fourth	Amendment,	 to	 the	state	 legislatures	 .	.	.	had,	 some	 two	months	
prior	to	that	proposal,	enacted	the	first	customs	statute,	Act	of	 July	31,	1789,	c.	5,	1	Stat.	29.	
Section	 24	 of	 this	 statute	 granted	 customs	 officials	 “full	 power	 and	 authority”	 to	 enter	 and	
search	“any	ship	or	vessel,	in	which	they	shall	have	reason	to	suspect	any	goods,	wares	or	mer-


































































































	 40.	 Id.	 See	 also	 Homeland	 Security	 Investigations,	 U.S.	 IMMIGRATION	 AND	 CUSTOMS	

















a	criminal	 investigation	 is	 simply	a	 tool	of	a	potentially	oppressive	




branch	 .	.	.	 has	 targeted	 individuals,	 using	 their	 movement	 across	
frontiers	to	obtain	information	that	otherwise	would	require	a	war-
rant	to	access.”50	These	searches	can	reveal	not	only	large	amounts	of	
information,	but	also	deeply	personal	 information	 that	violates	 the	














Searching	 devices	 further	 underscores	 the	 importance	 of	 rein-
forcing	 Fourth	 Amendment	 protections	 against	 unreasonable	
searches—even	those	conducted	at	the	border.	Not	cabining	the	use	















Even	outside	 the	 invasiveness	of	 electronic	devices,	 the	Fourth	
Amendment	 guarantees	 a	 right	 to	 be	 secure	 against	 unreasonable	











































border	 despite	 their	 law	 enforcement	 purpose.	 In	U.S.	 v.	 Schoor,	 a	
Ninth	Circuit	 case,	Drug	Enforcement	Administration	 (DEA)	agents	










“random	 search[]	 of	 any	 incoming	 passenger.”64	 Rather,	 these	 are	
searches	 that	are	conducted	 for	a	 law	enforcement	purpose	 that	 is	







fies	 for	 the	border	 search	 exception:	 the	personnel	 conducting	 the	
search	and	the	purpose	behind	the	search.	For	instance,	if	the	proper	
personnel	conduct	a	border	search	for	a	proper	border	search	pur-
pose,	 the	 search	 should	 be	 deemed	 acceptable	 with	 no	 additional	















non-border	 officials	 for	 a	 non-border	 purpose,	 the	 Fourth	 Amend-





This	 Section	 explores	 and	 explains	 the	 first	 consideration	 that	
courts	should	look	to	in	determining	if	a	search	at	the	border	is	truly	
a	 border	 search	 (and	 therefore	 free	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment	 re-
quirements	of	probable	cause	and	a	warrant):	personnel.	Focusing	on	








cept	 contraband.”67	 Today,	 as	 explained	 on	 the	 U.S.	 Customs	 and	
Border	 Protection	 website,	 the	 Office	 of	 Field	 Operations	 (OFO)	
within	U.S.	Customs	and	Border	Protection	is	“responsible	for	border	
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Border Non-Border 
Border Traditional border Border nexus 
Non-Border 
search, no required. If not 
individualized present, probable 
suspicion required cause and warrant 
(or warrant 
exception) required 
Probable c.ause and Probable c.ause and 
warrant ( or warrant warrant ( or warrant 







it	 may	 seem,	 as	 Congress	 has	 deemed	 that	 category	 of	 “customs	
agents”	may	 encompass	more	 than	 just	 those	with	 that	 job	 title.69	
Non-customs	government	officials	can	be	delegated	the	authority	to	























be	 implied	 without	 a	 formal	 agreement,	 order,	 or	 statutory	
	
	 68.	 US	Customs	and	Border	Protection,	Executive	Assistant	Commissioners’	Offices,	US	DEP’T	














































derscores	 the	 importance	 that	 Congress	 has	 put	 on	 personnel	 and	
	
	 77.	 United	States	v.	Brown,	858	F.	Supp.	297,	300	 (D.P.R.	1994)	 (holding	a	warrantless	
















highlight	going	 forward.	Unless	 further	 investigation	 reveals	 that	a	
law	enforcement	officer	was	properly	delegated	authority	to	conduct	
a	 border	 search,	 judges	 should	 feel	 comfortable	 assuming	 that	 the	
search	was	not	a	traditional	border	search.	To	hold	otherwise	would	
be	 to	grant	 law	enforcement	officers	nearly	unrestrained	power	 to	
conduct	a	search	near	a	border	and	be	contrary	to	statutory	law.	






authority	 to	 conduct	 border	 searches	only	to	 this	 limited	 group	 of	





































Courts	 have	 already	 been	 looking	 at	 the	 purpose	 of	 border	
searches.	 In	Victoria-Peguero,	 for	example,	 the	court	expressly	con-


















contested	 search	 testified	 that	 “his	 sole	 purpose	 in	 conducting	 the	



























[border	search]	rule	 from	[its]	 justifications.”94	 In	the	Eleventh	Cir-
cuit,	Judge	Jill	Pryor	explored	the	purpose	of	a	border	search	in	her	
dissent	in	United	States	v.	Vergara.95	Judge	Pryor	would	have	held	that	
a	 forensic	 search	 of	 a	 cell	 phone	 at	 a	 port	 unreasonable	 in	 Fourth	
Amendment	terms.96	She	rejected	the	idea	that	forensic	searches	of	
cell	phones	should	be	exempt	from	warrant	requirements	“because	
those	searches	may	produce	evidence	helpful	 in	 future	criminal	 in-
vestigations.”97	Further,	Judge	Pryor	stated	this	exemption	would	be	
unconnected	from	its	justifications	and	unreasonable.98		


























































preme	 Court	 has	 repeatedly	 held	 that	 the	 validity	 of	 a	 search	 or	
seizure	under	the	Fourth	Amendment	does	not	depend	on	the	subjec-
tive	motives	of	government	officials.”104		













officers	 had	 probable	 cause	 to	 pull	 over	 a	 driver,	 but	 the	 driver	

















then	an	 inquiry	 into	the	purpose	 is	appropriate,	both	under	Whren	
and	under	the	proposed	border	nexus	standard.		
As	noted	by	Professor	Kerr,	“Whren	does	not	foreclose	articulat-
ing	 objective	 tests	 that	 distinguish	 real	 government	 interests	 from	
false	ones.”111	If	tests	are	permissible	to	distinguish	real	government	
interests	from	false	ones,	then	surely	it	is	permissible	for	a	court	to	




pose	 of	 a	 search	will	 help	 courts	 distinguish	when	 a	 search	 at	 the	






















uate	bad	 faith	or	pretext	at	 the	border,	others	have	recognized	 the	
importance.112	Courts	should	be	concerned	and	vigilant	that	border	
searches	do	not	become	“a	purposeful	and	general	means	of	discov-










Part	 III	 describes	 the	 proposed	 border	 nexus	 standard,	 which	
should	apply	when	proper	border	personnel	conduct	a	search	for	a	
seemingly	non-border	purpose.	Historically,	the	need	to	“regulate	the	




as	protecting	national	 security,	 preventing	 the	 import	 or	 export	 of	
contraband,	or	collecting	duties),	or	to	a	transnational	crime	as	de-




































sible	 as	 a	 border	 search,	 violated	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment.117	 The	
Fourth	Circuit	 held	 that	 for	 a	border	 search	 to	be	 reasonable,	 “the	
Government	must	 have	 individualized	 suspicion	 of	 an	 offense	 that	
bears	some	nexus	to	the	border	search	exception’s	purposes	of	pro-
tecting	national	security,	collecting	duties,	blocking	the	entry	of	un-





band,	 or	 collecting	 duties)	 for	 the	 border	 search	 exception.119	 The	
border	 search	 exception	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 “general	 rule”	 that	 “the	
scope	 of	 a	 warrant	 exception	 should	 be	 defined	 by	 its	 justifica-
tions.”120	If	a	border	search	becomes	too	far	“attenuated”	from	the	his-
toric	rationales	that	justify	an	exception	from	the	Fourth	Amendment,	














the	 border	 search	 exception	 is	 “long-standing.”122	 In	 Ramsey,	 the	

























cally	eclipse[]	 individuals’	privacy	 interests	 .	.	.	when	 the	suspected	
offenses	have	little	or	nothing	to	do	with	the	border.”126	This	is	nor-
matively	 true	 and	 a	 compelling	 reason	 to	 adopt	 the	 transnational	
nexus.	 Additionally,	 it	 may	 be	 difficult	 for	 law	 enforcement	 to	
	
	 121.	 Aigbekaen,	943	F.3d	at	721.	See	Kolsuz,	890	F.3d	at	143.	Because	the	“functional	equiv-




















Allowing	 the	 investigation	 of	 transnational	 crimes	 allows	 this	 con-
cern	to	continue.	Moreover,	one	of	the	core	justifications	for	border	
searches	 is	 searching	 for	 contraband.	 Materials	 used	 to	 commit	 a	
transnational	crime	can	often	be	considered,	as	they	will	often	be	con-
sidered	 contraband.	 In	 addition,	 it	 goes	 toward	 protecting	 the	 na-
tional	security	of	the	country	to	prevent	the	entry	of	persons	using	
the	border	crossing	as	part	of	committing	a	transnational	crime.	This	






















(b)	It	 is	committed	 in	one	State	but	a	substantial	part	of	 its	
preparation,	planning,	direction	or	control	takes	place	in	an-
other	State;		





It	 should	 not	 be	 sufficient	 to	 argue,	 as	 the	 government	 did	 in	
Aigbekaen,	 that	 the	 crime	 itself	 “commonly	 involve[s]	 cross-border	
movements.”129	 In	 Aigbekaen,	 the	 defendant	 was	 suspected	 of	 sex	
trafficking,	 a	 crime	 that	often	 crosses	 international	borders.	At	 the	
time	of	the	search,	however,	the	government	had	“no	reasonable	ba-
sis	to	suspect	that	Aigbekaen’s	domestic	crimes	had	any	such	trans-











circumstances	 of	 the	 case,	 involving	 the	 forensic	 search	 of	
Aigbekaen’s	electronic	devices.	But	the	rationale	for	the	holding	is	not	
limited	to	electronic	device	searches	and	it	should	provide	persuasive	



























are	conducting	a	search	pursuant	 to	a	request	 from	a	separate	 law	
enforcement	agency	for	an	express	purpose	of	uncovering	evidence	
for	a	criminal	investigation	with	no	border	nexus.	Thus,	extending	the	







of	a	criminal	 investigation	or	at	 the	direction	of	 traditional	 law	en-
forcement	officers	and	(2)	the	required	border	nexus	is	absent.	This	
is	 because	 such	 searches	 are	 not	 really	 border	 searches—they	 are	
searches	for	law	enforcement	that	happen	to	take	place	at	the	border	
and	therefore	should	be	subject	to	the	Fourth	Amendment’s	warrant	































exception.	 Courts	 should	 require	 probable	 cause	 and	 a	warrant	 or	
recognized	warrant	exception	for	searches	at	the	border	that	are	not	
truly	border	searches	because	they	lack	a	border	nexus.	









ministrable	 for	 customs	 agents	 on	 the	 ground,	while	 still	 applying	






intruding	 on	 individuals’	 privacy.”141	 The	 standard	 applied	 will	
	












introduction	 is	 investigating	 real	 estate	 fraud	 and	 asks	 customs	
agents	to	search	their	target.	This	is	clearly	an	impermissible	unrea-
















cause	 Irving	 was	 suspected	 of	 travelling	 to	 Mexico	 to	 commit	 the	
crime	for	which	he	was	under	investigation,145	there	was	a	transna-
tional	nexus,	as	the	crime	was	committed	in	more	than	one	State.	Fur-
thermore,	 agents	 searched	 Irving’s	belongings	not	only	 to	 find	evi-
dence	of	 a	 crime	but	 to	 stop	 the	 introduction	of	 contraband	 (here,	
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Non-Border Probable cause 





cause and warrant ( or 
warrant exception) 
required 
Probable cause and 
warrant ( or warrant 
exception) required 
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! ! Purpose ! 

















Probable cause and 






the	 arrival	 of	 suspected	 drug	 traffickers,150	 the	 search	 would	 also	
likely	be	permissible	under	a	border	nexus	standard.	The	crime	was	











national.	 If	 the	government	was	similarly	unable	 to	 show	they	had	
probable	cause	 for	 their	belief	 the	drug	ring	was	 international,	 the	
search	would	also	fail.		
Conclusion	



















Border Traditional border 
search, no individual-
ized suspicion requir 
Non-Border Probable c.ause and 
warrant (or warran 
exception) required warrant excep-



















porating	 the	 standard	 into	 training	 materials	 on	 border	 searches	
would	be	a	particularly	helpful	step.		
Given	the	vast	power	that	a	warrantless	and	suspicionless	search	





tecting	 the	 United	 States	 and	 crime	 enforcement	 with	 individual	
privacy	interests.	
	
